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The post-Second World War international economic order integrated all the willing 
economies in world economic-political institutions under the leadership of the US. The 
leader floated the strategy of extensive globalization whereby the industrialized 
economies got the chance to extend their production possibility curves via penetration 
into the large economies in the Third World through the transnational corporations. 
Extensive globalization offset the potential threat perceived by the leader from the 
countries in G-7 and accommodated the emerging large market economies from the 
Third World through membership in groups like G-20. While the leader plans to 
prolong her command over the world economy, the large emerging market economies 
from the Third World can explore the possibilities to consolidate themselves in the 
same process. What is to be ensured is protection of a large number of small 
economies from the Third World who often remain left out from the umbrella of 
extensive globalization.  
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Extensive Globalization 
Choice of the Emerging Market Economies from the Third World  
 
 
Post-Second World War international economic order (IEO) shows a political-
economic scenario different from the era of industrial revolution pioneered by the 
British that continued up to the beginning of the First World War. Inter-War 
disturbances (1919-1939) accompanied by Great Depression (1929-1933) led to the 
emergence of Keynesianism that pleaded for state intervention to save capitalism. 
Based on such historical lessons, the leader of the post-Second War world 
capitalism, the United States (US), shouldered the responsibility to save capitalism. 
In order to do this she formed an inclusive network of both the Allies and the Axis 
Power. Subsequent formation of the most powerful economic group, G-7, was an 
offshoot of this accommodation. The political umbrella also got a new shape by 
being the United Nations (UN) under the tutelage of the US that replaced the former 
League of Nations under the British tutelage. 
 
G-7 formed in 1975 initiated by the US is a brief version of G-10 formed in 
1962. G-7 includes as members the US, the UK, Germany, Japan, France, Italy, 
and Canada. All these countries pledge to carry forward the interests of capitalism. 
In parallel, there came a political Security Council within the post-War formed UN 
that had five permanent members, namely, the US, the UK, France, USSR (Russia 
after 1990) and China (Taiwan prior to 1975). The leader thus encircled the global 
system by the political-economic power of G-7 and the Security Council.  
 
The post-War world necessitated accommodation of the socialist camp also 
by inclusion of the USSR showing a bipolar world. Post-disintegration USSR in 
1990 did not change the scenario much other that making Russia closer to G-7 
through invitations to attend meetings of the latter. The decolonized countries in 
Asia, Africa and South America were nowhere near the apex power as visible 
immediately after the Second World War. These countries were not in a position to 
alter the dynamics internal to the mature capitalist economies and also had no 
power to delink them from the cobweb of capitalism. Many of these countries were, 
however, drawn into the discussions in Conferences to launch world institutions to 
execute the rules. The formation of regional groups by these decolonized countries 
also did not matter much to disturb the power structure headed by the US. The 
shrinking space for mobility of capital within the grown up capitalist economies 
forced the leader to start re-thinking about accommodating the large emerging 
market economies, particularly the post-Reform (post-1978) China, and post-NEP 
(post-1991) India.  
 
We may think about some countries in the decolonized Third World who are 
large by size of population along with a large usable resource base and a vast 
geographic area. Theoretically, a large economy is one which has, or may have 
subject to policy intervention, a large market. Operationally, by a large economy we 
mean a country having a size of population more than 100 millions during 1990s. 
Most of these countries are in Asia, namely, China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and 
Bangladesh. The other countries that satisfy this criterion are Brazil from South 
America and Nigeria from Africa. There are, thus, seven countries from the Third 
World that may be clubbed as L-7 that show the potential market for entry by the 
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DMEs through the strategy of extensive globalization. By extensive globalization we 
mean the strategy of the leader to extend the output frontier via penetration into 
the potential markets of large economies using the transnational corporations 
(TNCs) at their command (Majumder, 1998: 42).  
 
The paper proposes that this strategy of extensive globalization may really 
show the choice of the emerging large market economies from the Third World. The 
rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section I we talk about the 
international economic order and the strategy of the leader. In section II we present 
the economic indicators of the developed market economies and the large emerging 
market economies from the Third World. In section III we analyse extensive 
globalization by compulsion and choice of countries. Finally, in section IV we offer 
concluding comments. 
  
I.  International Economic Order and the Strategy of the Leader 
An IEO is an arrangement of politically sovereign states in an order, ascending or 
descending, based on and guided by the controlling power of a single state 
acknowledged as the leader. The leader in such an order exercises control on other 
states through technology and trade, and if necessary, military power. The IEO 
rests on relative state power (Vital, 1972: 87). It shows the power of a particular 
state to withstand the pressures of the rest of the world and the legitimacy of the 
state within. Thus, state power has two manifestations – one external, the other 
internal (Majumder, 1996: 478). In the order that shows the hierarchy of states, the 
leader chalks out the rules, gets those rules legitimized by others. The voluntary 
participation of the states in the IEO shows consensus. Corresponding to a 
particular power structure, the rules dictated by the leader, once legitimized by 
participation of states, show not only the trajectory of participation but also the 
world institutions and organizations which were designed to frame and follow rules 
(Anell and Nygren, 1980:  119).  
 
The end of the Second World War offered a new scenario in international 
relations. The US as the new leader that took over the responsibility to control the 
globe from the erstwhile imperial power, Britain, made the newly decolonized 
countries believe that she ‘goes global’. To give meaning to this strategy, the US 
accommodated not only the ‘Allies’ of the War, namely, Britain and France, but also 
the ‘Axis Power’, namely, Germany, Japan, and Italy. The newly emerging power of 
the-then USSR ideologically on the opposite camp of the globe was perhaps the 
immediate basis of such accommodation. This also was supposed to have helped 
an expanding capitalist system. For political governance, the power of the USSR 
could not have been ignored by the leader, when strategically budding ‘China 
Power’ was silenced by her non-recognition in global fora. The lessons of the War 
also revealed that Soviet power and her Asiatic influence was too high to be 
ignored. The immediate recognition of the bilateral world by all the participants in 
the IEO had unequal consequences on them – on the one hand the rivalry-based 
power states, namely, the US and the USSR, created a cocoon that camouflaged 
their hunger for power sharing globally, and on the other marginalized the newly 
decolonized countries who had timid intention to keep equidistance from both the 
powers. In reality, however, they remained tamed by both the power states at least 
up to the disintegration of the USSR in 1989. 
 
The birth of the unipolar world post-disintegration of the USSR and the 
simultaneous fall of the Berlin Wall that united divided Germany made the task of 
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administering the globe both easy and difficult for the leader. It became easy 
because of absence of any challenge from the parallel big power; it became difficult 
because the leader would fail to find any other state to blame for any unwarranted 
outcome in the global domain. But the post-1989 period made the task of 
exercising the ‘accommodative principle’ easier for the leader when Russia, the 
dominant segment of the former USSR, became itself willing to join an already 
consolidated G-7.  
 
Going global by accommodating all the ‘willing economies’ is understood 
post-Second World War particularly in the context of intra-European conflicts for 
domination over the globe. A system that came out because of the initiative of the 
US took a ‘legal shape’ incorporated in the rules of the world organizations like the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, known as World 
Bank), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT, post-1995 World Trade Organization). The economies of 
the world as members in these bodies have unequal power. A parallel moral 
authority, the UN, was floated by the leader funded primarily by the advanced 
capitalist countries. The UN as the world super institution gave the leader 
legitimacy in the global power structure. 
 
The reason why the leader continued with globalization post-1989 by 
accommodating the willing economies is the changing location of the state in the 
hierarchy of states over time (Table 1). 
  
Table 1: Global Power Structure in History, 15th to 21st Century  
Phase Time Span State in Command Global War 
I 1494-1579 Portugal Italian and Indian Ocean War, 
1494-1516 
II 1580-1689 Netherlands Spanish Wars, 1580-1609 
III 1689-1792 Britain I Wars of Louis XIV, 1688-1713 
IV 1792-1914 Britain II Wars of Napoleon, 1792-1815  
V 1914-2010 (Contd.) United States World Wars I and II, 1914-18 and 
1939-45 
Source: Structured from Modelski and Morgan, 2006, p. 9. 
 
Global power structure shows unequal relationship of states based on 
domination and subordination (Jones and Philips, 2006: 22). The power structure 
itself has undergone a sea change over time. In 1914 Britain had sixty dependent 
colonies plus India (O’Brian, 1990: 12). She paid the penalty for her territorial over-
extension. Both Britain and Germany by the end of the First World War got 
weakened that opened the space for the US to reframe the power structure. The 
19th century belonged to the UK by the strength of industrial revolution and 
colonies used as reserve space to feed that revolution. The inter-War period of the 
twentieth century showed the British economy in turmoil by Great Depression 
leading to its subordinate position vis-a-vis the US economy by the end of the 
Second World War. Though the end of the War showed the beginning of 
Americanization of the rest of the century, Britain continued to remain an 
important ally of the US in global affairs (Gamble, 1990: 75).      
 
The world history has taught the leader to protect her position of number 
one by forming an inner circle, namely, G-7. This explains not only an immediate 
response to the dissidence from the consolidated decolonized countries through the 
General Assembly but also to thwart any challenges from within the capitalist 
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network of countries. The basic reason for the continuation of the globalization 
strategy by the leader post-bipolar world was ‘the challenge posed by other major 
powers like Japan and Western Europe to its hegemony’ (Kothari, 1995: 1600). The 
leader floated the strategy of extensive globalization by not only allowing the allies 
in G-7 to extend their production boundary beyond their own space but also 
bringing under her umbrella the emerging market economies from the Third World. 
One of the major techniques was to expand the space for capital through the TNCs 
rooted basically in G-7 and operating increasingly in the emerging market 
economies from the Third World. The strategy of extensive globalization really 
shows the compulsions of the leader and the scope for the emerging large market 
economies from the Third World (Majumder, 1998: 43). 
 
II.  Economic Indicators of Developed Market Economies and Emerging 
Large Market Economies from the Third World 
Given the post-Second World War IEO, we construct an analytical structure based 
on the developed market economies (DMEs) from the advanced capitalist world and 
the large emerging market economies (LEMEs) from the Third World. While the first 
one is a real category by membership of countries, the second one is a hypothetical 
category with membership of countries from the Third World each of who fulfils the 
criterion of having population more than 100 millions. We take 1990s as the base 
time reference. The size of population is taken as the first indicator supplemented 
by related indicators like output, merchandise trade, shares in world financial 
institutions etc.  
 
We consider a large economy as one which has, or may have subject to 
policy intervention, a large market. The rationale of taking population as the 
starting point is that the size of population by participation will show the market in 
a macro sense. The criterion, namely, the required size is satisfied by seven 
countries from the Third World, namely, China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Brazil, and Nigeria. We call this analytical category as L-7/ LEMEs. 
 
Economic indicators are really offshoots of the historical processes through 
which the countries traverse. Watertight compartmentalization of countries itself is 
a problematic because some countries start late, some follow independent path and 
some under the tutelage of others. The initial distribution of power also matters in 
understanding the relative location of countries in the hierarchy of economies. The 
participation of countries also reflect if those countries have capacity to absorb 
shocks by being integrated with the countries that are well ahead of others in terms 
of economic weights. 
 
The countries in the Third World are mainly from Asia, Africa and South 
America who either were decolonized late in world history of industrialization or 
remained perpetually dependent on the DMEs. Citing data since the early 1990s, 
we see that in 1991 less than one-sixth of world population settled in DMEs 
commanded around three-fourth of world output, while more than three-fourths of 
world population living in the TWCs shared only one-sixth of world output. One-
sixth of world population in the DMEs enjoyed a per capita income more than 20 
times what 77.0 per cent of world population settled in the Third World did  (Table 
2). 
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Table 2: Distribution of World Output, 1991 
Economies/Countries World 
Population (%) 
World Output 
(%) 
Per Capita GDP ($) 
DMEs 15.67 72.73 1821.97 
Economies in Transition 7.28 10.59 571.58 
TWCs 77.05 16.67 84.96 
Note: Output is measured by GDP, in billions of 1998 Dollars. 
Source: United Nations, 1992, World Economic Survey, p. 11. 
 
Such command over world output by the DMEs is a logical corollary of the 
distribution of world resources (Wilkinson, 1996: 256). The initial unequal control 
over resources and hence its derivative output often makes the inequality among 
countries more acute by technological intervention. Technological revolution by 
itself expands the world production possibility curve, but at the operational domain 
because of unequal access have adverse consequences on some countries that 
perpetuate poverty in those countries (Hymar, 1990: 189). We pose the data in the 
light of the above. 
 
On a time-span of last two decades, what we observe is that one-tenth of 
world population settled in G-7 considered as the representative of the DMEs 
command two-thirds of world output and half of world exports. Contrary to this, 
half of world population settled in L-7 command one-twentieth of world output and 
one-twentieth of world exports. Within G-7, US alone command the lion’s share of 
total output. However, in exports, it is Germany and to some extent Japan that 
pose challenges to the US. In case of countries in L-7, it is China that commands 
most of the output and exports. The countries intra-G-7 and intra-L-7 thus are 
unequal by economic strength. What is more striking is the declining share of G-7 
in world output. For example, at the end of the first decade of the 21st century, the 
share of G-7 came down to half of world output relative to two-thirds commanded 
during the last decade of the 20th century. In parallel, there occurred a monotonic 
decline in share of G-7 in world exports during the first decade of the 21st century 
relative to the 1990s. The share of L-7 in world output more than doubled at the 
end of the first decade of the 21st century relative to what it was at the early part of 
1990s mainly because of the high growth in China. The share of L-7 in world 
exports nearly doubled during the same period mainly because of the contribution 
by China (Tables 3-8).  
 
Table 3: G-7 in World Population (Percentage of World total), 1991-2008, Selected 
Years 
Year U.S. U.K. Japan Germany France Italy Canada G-7 Total 
1991 4.72 1.07 2.48 1.49 1.06 1.08 0.51 12.41 
1995 4.63 1.04 2.2 1.44 1.02 1.02 0.52 11.8 
2000 4.7 1.0 2.1 1.4 1.0 1.0 0.5 11.5 
2008 4.54 0.91 1.91 1.22 0.92 0.89 0.49 10.88 
Source: World Bank, World Development Report, Several Issues 
 
Table 4: L-7 in World Population (Percentage of World total) 1991-2008, Selected 
Years 
Year China India Indonesia Brazil Pakistan Bangladesh Nigeria L-7 Total 
1991 21.48 16.19 3.39 2.83 2.16 2.07 1.85 49.97 
1995 21.15 16.37 3.40 2.80 2.29 2.11 1.95 50.09 
2000 21.1 17.0 3.5 2.8 2.3 2.2 2.1 51.1 
2008 19.81 17.03 3.40 2.87 2.48 2.39 2.25 50.23 
Source: Same as in Table 3. 
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Table 5: G-7 in World Output (Percentage of World total) 1991-2008, Selected Years 
Year U.S. U.K. Japan Germany France Italy Canada G-7 Total 
1991 25.93 4.05 15.54 7.27 5.54 5.32 5.32 66.01 
1995 24.96 3.97 18.34 8.67 5.51 3.90 2.04 67.42 
2000 31.1 4.5 14.9 6.0 4.1 3.4 2.2 66.7 
2008 23.44 4.36 8.10 6.02 4.71 3.78 2.31 52.72 
Source: Same as in Table 3. 
 
Table 6: L-7 in World Output (Percentage of World total) 1991-2008, Selected Years 
Year China India Indonesia Brazil Pakistan Bangladesh Nigeria L-7 Total 
1991 1.71 1.02 0.54 1.91 0.18 0.11 0.16 5.63 
1995 2.50 1.16 0.71 2.47 0.21 0.10 0.09 7.2 
2000 3.4 1.5 0.5 1.9 0.2 0.2 0.1 7.8 
2008 7.14 2.01 0.85 2.66 0.27 0.13 0.35 13.41 
Source: Same as in Table 3. 
 
Table 7: G-7 in World Exports (Percentage of World total), 1991-2008, Selected Years 
Year U.S. U.K. Japan Germany France Italy Canada G-7 Total 
1991 11.91 5.54 9.42 12.04 6.38 5.07 3.74 54.10 
1995 11.36 4.70 8.61 10.18 5.57 4.49 3.73 48.66 
2000 12.3 4.4 7.5 8.7 4.7 3.7 4.4 45.7 
2008 8.06 2.84 4.85 9.08 3.77 3.34 2.83 34.77 
Source: Same as in Table 3. 
 
Table 8: L-7 in World Exports (Percentage of World total), 1991-2008, Selected Years 
Year China India Indonesia Brazil Pakistan Bangladesh Nigeria L-7 Total 
1991 2.18 0.53 0.837 0.94 0.19 0.05 0.36 5.12 
1995 2.89 0.59 0.88 0.90 0.15 0.06 0.22 5.72 
2000 3.9 0.7 1.0 0.9 0.1 0.1 0.3 7.0 
2008 8.85 1.11 0.86 1.22 0.12 0.09 0.51 12.76 
Source: Same as in Table 3. 
 
The decelerating shares of G-7 and the accelerating shares of L-7 in world 
output and exports imply the potential strength of the LEMEs. The IEO operates 
through institutions. Hence, these institutions need to remain in control. Each 
member country in the IMF, for example, has a quota determined by the country’s 
GNP, foreign trade and currency reserves. Voting rights of each country and its 
borrowing facilities are determined by this quota (Anell and Nygren, 1980: 42; 
Hoogvelt, 1982: 83-94). The IMF functions on dollar vote. For DMEs this voting 
share or dollar vote declined from 78.5 per cent in 1950 to 66.5 per cent in 1980 
while for the US alone it declined from 34.7 per cent to 21.5 per cent (Sauvant, 
1981: 293). The share of G-7 in IMF stood at 45.91 with that of US alone 18.25 in 
dollar vote as percentage of total and that of L-7 stood at 8.62 on January 31, 1996 
(CMIE, 1996, July: 75). The leader has to stop this declining dollar vote in IMF. 
Growth in output-cum-exports is a compulsion for the leader at least to stop this 
decline. In parallel, to run the political system, the UN has to be financed. The UN 
spends but cannot earn. The budget of the UN is determined by the US and Japan. 
The US share in the UN budget in 2004, for example, was 24.5 per cent and that of 
Japan 18.8 per cent while that of G-7 as a whole was 70.9 per cent. Contrary to 
this, the share of L-7 in UN budget for 2004-06 was 4.2 per cent half of which was 
that of China (Websites). While the US has remained the undisputed leader by 
recognition of her shares in world output, and in world institutions like the World 
Bank, IMF, and Budget of the UN, countries like Japan and Germany are not far 
behind. While none of the countries in L-7 is as mighty as the leader, some of them 
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are emerging as credible global power like China-India-Brazil. Also, the internal 
markets of these countries are promising for the leader as destinations of capital. 
Extensive globalization shows the way.    
   
III. Extensive Globalization: Compulsions and Choice 
At least two types of small economies emerged post-Second World War – one is the 
Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs), namely, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and 
Korea, and the other is the expendable virtually non-accommodated small 
economies like Sudan, Somalia, and Suriname, all from the Third World. The NICs 
as the export-dependent small economies developed a peculiar economic structure 
by the mid-1990s. In world population, these four countries together shared less 
than one per cent, in world output around two per cent and in world exports less 
than ten per cent. Their import-GDP ratio (excluding Taiwan) in 1995, for example, 
was as high as 76 per cent and the export-GDP ratio was 81 per cent. The imports 
of these NICs constitute 16.78 per cent of total exports by G-7 that shows high 
power of absorption of these countries in spite of being small by size of population 
and GDP (World Bank, 1997: 214-215, 236-237, 242-243). 
 
Of these NICs, Hong Kong and Singapore are city states. Hong Kong was 
transferred from the UK to China on July 1, 1997 while Singapore separated her 
from Malaysia in early 1960s and soon became dependent on TNCs for 
entrepreneurship and technology (Lee, 1997: 58-61, 68). Taiwan as a breakaway 
unit from communist China got recognition from the US much earlier than the 
Republic of China by being a member of the UN Security Council up to 1975. Both 
Taiwan and Korea derived external stimulus by being ‘close’ to Japan.  
 
The non-industrializing small economies in the Third World have narrow 
resource base, sub-optimum utilization of available resources, often foreign 
controlled home resources for extraction-cum-exports, very low share in world 
output, narrow product-mix and restricted operation of scale economies. Many of 
these small economies depend on a dominant trade partner, and many peg their 
currencies to either dollar (for mostly Latin American countries) or to franc (for 
mostly countries in Africa). For a small economy characterised by poor resource 
base by nature and size of population, premature exposure to international 
competition often becomes a compulsion unless these countries become ‘clients’ or 
‘dependent allies’ of industrialized countries (Majumder, 2003).  
 
While the expendable small economies are not in the net of the DMEs for 
reaping benefits of integration, the latter also understand that the NICs may 
ultimately show limited possibilities of expansion for them in spite of the extremely 
high trade ratios. This is mainly because of the small size of population and narrow 
resource base of these NICs. One may argue that global division of labour based on 
the operations of the TNCs across countries is different from the social division of 
labour relevant for a national economy (Majumder, 2000). But then for a national 
economy to be the cheapest producer, that economy has to have the scale economy 
in that component seen as an intermediate product, and hence, the internal size of 
the market along with availability of cheap labour matters (Vital, 1972: 42; Hymar, 
1990: 195). Moreover, the operations of the TNCs are conditional upon the approval 
of the nation-state along with the capacity of the collaborating home firm. In both 
the cases, it is not the small economy that is at relative advantage. In other words, 
even if the NICs showed the beginning of the export-led success, the DMEs 
understand that the strategy cannot go a long way to ensure uninterrupted 
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expansion of the base on which global capital can circulate. Thus, the enlargement 
of the base by accommodating more economies becomes a compulsion for the 
DMEs. 
 
The economies that had to be accommodated were obviously the large ones 
like China, India, and Brazil from the Third World. The economic problems for the 
post-war decolonized countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America were not dearth of 
natural resources. The problems lay in performing the role of a colony, following 
colonial division of labour, thus, exporting raw materials and importing capital 
goods and technology (Sauvant, 1981: 17; Bagchi, 1982: 118-119). The economies 
in the Third World inherited this structural deformation that reinforced a skewed 
internal consumption pattern dependent on technology import-led production of 
commodities. The necessity to break this inheritance, and hence to come out from 
perpetual dependency led the TWCs to demand a New International Economic 
Order (NIEO) in the General Assembly of the United Nations on May 1, 1974. This 
followed the ‘Oil Shock’ of 1973 that divided the TWCs along ‘oil-importing’ versus 
‘oil-exporting’ categories. It is sometimes supposed that oil power of the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) strengthened the TWCs to 
express voice in the UN (Oppermann, 1986: 23; Streeten, 1981: 240). The Third 
World dissent, however, dates long back to 1955 through the Bandung Conference 
in which a group of 29 Afro-Asian countries assembled to express solidarity for co-
operation and development.  
 
The declaration of NIEO by the TWCs reflected compulsions of these 
countries because they reached the limit of remaining dependent on export of low-
tech primary goods and import of high-tech capital goods and technology. The 
NIEO argued for the establishment of the right of sovereignty of states over their 
natural resources, and ultimately, the right to nationalize the firms using these 
resources. The TWCs advanced their demand at the UN that centred on the non-
sustainability of the consumption-mix at home unless supported by technology-
cum-product-mix at home. Since technology could not be developed easily through 
internal R&D, the TWCs demanded ‘access to the achievements of modern science 
and technology, and promoting the transfer of technology suited to their economies’ 
(Anell and Nygren, 1980: 190). G-7 rejected the vital provisions of the NIEO 
(Sauvant, 1981: 184- 205).  
 
Accommodating large economies from the Third World by the leader, as 
different from rejecting the NIEO, was to contain pressures from the emerging 
power in Asia as well as thwart challenges from within G-7. The selection of 
countries from the Third World was made easy by post-Reform (1978) China 
moving towards market economy and post-NEP India (1991) moving towards being 
a free market open economy. The offshoot was extensive globalization whereby 
selected large market economies from the Third World were made members in the 
newly formed global policy coordinating institution, G-20, in 1999 that is often seen 
as an enlargement of G-7 (Table 9). 
 
Table 9: Members in G-20 
Institution Members 
G-20 G-7 plus EU plus Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, India, 
Indonesia, Mexico, Russian Fed., Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South 
Korea, Turkey, Bretton Woods Institutions.  
Source: UNDP, 1999, Human Development Report, p. 109. 
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 In addition to the possibilities of expansion through trade, the LEMEs 
started to see themselves as destinations of foreign direct investment. The potential 
challengers within G-7 simultaneously got the opportunities to capture the 
combined market through the TNCs under their control. Corporate power and state 
power inside the capitalist world got a wider space for circulation of capital.  
 
The problems of the LEMEs enveloped in extensive globalization were 
different from those of the countries in G-7. G-7 produces more than what these 
countries could absorb showing a need for ‘vent for surplus’, while LEMEs were yet 
to be ready to absorb that surplus. In absence of adequate capacity to import by 
LEMEs, the countries in G-7 would enter into those selected TWCs by direct 
investment by utilization of excess liquidity and take advantage of the market 
internal to those LEMEs. For the countries in G-7 it was ‘inverse international 
trickle down’ where the foreign investment-led growth of the LEMEs would help the 
DMEs overcome the crises of utilization of capital. The TNCs affiliated to G-7 were 
assigned the task to impregnate directly the potential markets of the LEMEs 
through extraction and utilization of resources internal to the LEMEs (Alejandro, 
1981: 233). In their efforts to attract capital through FDI, the TWCs tend to 
compete within whereby some TWCs succeed at the cost of others. For example, 
during mid-1990s, China alone accounted for more than one-third of total FDI 
destined for all developing countries (GOI, 1997-98: 88). Circularity of history is 
evident by re-emergence of the necessity to use the decolonized large countries as 
‘collaborative colonies’ for extraction of natural resources by initial application of 
technology and ‘transferred capital’ but then to ultimately convert natural 
resources of LEMEs into capital of DMEs. The short-term high growth of the 
LEMEs thus gets transformed into long-term vulnerability of the LEMEs. The latent 
technique in the strategy of extensive globalization was to ensure ‘go slow-cum-
dependent’ growth for the LEMEs to maintain supremacy of the leader keeping the 
LEMEs under control. 
 
The basic characteristics in the strategy of extensive globalization floated by 
the leader were (1) inclusion of the LEMEs through TNCs and international 
financial institutions, (2) containing challenges within the imperial system, (3) 
legitimization in the UN and other supra-national bodies of the practices inherent 
in extensive globalization. Implementation of this strategy is a compulsion for the 
leader at least to protect her supremacy and maintain the rank of number one in 
the hierarchy of states.  
 
The TNCs, because of its power to command capital and technology and its 
ability to rationalize their use on a global scale, are strategized by the G-7 to ensure 
growth on both the sides – G-7 and LEMEs (Hymar, 1990: 194). This is a reflection 
of social production on a global scale that is global division of labour practiced by 
the TNCs. However, this also may invite technological dualism for the hosts in the 
Third World whose product-technology structure is far behind the capacity to 
absorb the high-tech vision of the TNCs. The demand structure in the TWCs being 
far ahead of that of DMEs by income elasticity, the corresponding technology 
structure of the DMEs remains less relevant for the TWCs. Under these 
circumstances, once the TNCs under the tutelage of the DMEs start controlling the 
commodity-consumption mix of the TWCs, it becomes a replica of those of the 
DMEs. Most of the decolonized countries with colonially trained decision-makers 
welcome technologies developed in colonizing countries for growth. Impossibility of 
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delinking from the capitalist order forces these countries to remain hosts for TNCs-
cum-technologies. 
 
Potentially the LEMEs are in a position to alter the terms on which they have 
been participating in the IEO, because of its size of population, large natural 
resource base, large geographic area, and long costal belt with ports. The LEMEs 
can use the TNCs at home to their advantage for exports and innovations. Each of 
these countries in LEMEs is large enough to expose a part of natural resources to 
these TNCs for utilization and offering scope to the manpower in abundant supply 
to be used for that. This size shows adequacy for capacity utilization and scale 
economies. Within the immediate future, these countries from the Third World may 
not be able to delink them from the cobweb of capitalist order for their (i) 
accumulated external debt, (ii) membership in world bodies, and (iii) role performed 
by the national middle class who carries capitalist ideology in life. The position of 
subordination in global power structure can be reverted if ‘inverse international 
trickle down’ works that lifts the TWCs to a level where they can put pressure on 
the leader. The initial heterogeneous nature of these TWCs may be overcome by 
consolidation once the small economies are also taken into confidence. 
 
The strategy of extensive globalization excludes most of the small economies 
from the process of global decision-making. While large economies can maintain 
high rates of growth and a large vector of consumer goods based on scale 
economies at home and social division of labour at the national scale, the small 
economies cannot afford to do so (Scott, 1998: 33). A small economy is open by 
compulsion and hence subject to external shocks. The export frontier for such 
economies remains vulnerable by both commodity-mix and country direction. For 
example, Chad depends mainly on export earnings from cotton, Chile on copper, 
Congo on wood, Ghana on cocoa, Cuba on sugar (Harrison, 1980: 338). The 
problems get aggravated when a few TNCs control this export frontier on behalf of 
these notionally sovereign countries. The small economy’s high degree of 
dependence on foreign markets for exports, on foreign sources for import of 
technology, its small home market to allow division of labour to operate makes it 
vulnerable to external forces. For the dominant DMEs small economies at first 
seem to be irrelevant and expendable. Because of challenges within, however, the 
dominant economies will try to assure obedience of the small economies specific to 
them. In addition, in the context of imminent exercise of power by the LEMEs, the 
DMEs will keep the apparently expendable small economies under its tutelage lest 
these economies shift their loyalty to the LEMEs. The responsibility of growth of the 
small open economies from the Third World, thus, is shouldered by the DMEs. 
 
IV. Concluding Comments 
Though extensive globalization is designed to accommodate countries from the 
Third World, particularly the LEMEs, the power structure remains unchanged by 
hegemonic control over the global phenomena. While the modus operandi changed 
post-decolonization, the new global institutions have remained heavily weighted in 
favour of the leader. For example, the dollar vote in decision-making in IMF and 
World Bank de facto shows veto power of the leader that makes participation of 
member-countries asymmetric. This goes parallel to political veto power of the 
select five in the Security Council of the UN that makes the whole system 
undemocratic. The apparently democratic WTO by its semi-legal nature in 
functioning virtually prohibits the small economies from the Third World to 
participate in the wings of this organization.  
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What is needed is to exert strong pressure by the LEMEs in global 
institutions in favour of these small economies to make them relevant in the IEO. 
Such pressures are already visible. For example, the necessity to form a pressure 
group from the TWCs was surmounted when IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa 
as members) held a meeting of their foreign ministers in June 2003 at Brasilia. 
Following the WTO Cancun Ministerial Summit in September 2003, however, the 
need was felt for a stronger group by extension of IBSA and China thus joined IBSA 
later to make it CIBS (China, India, Brazil, and South Africa). The demonstration by 
India and Brazil to block the Doha negotiations at the WTO shows the virtual veto 
power of these countries meaning thereby that any consensus-based decision at 
WTO has to consider the views of these countries seriously. The system has started 
changing a little of late when in addition to Russia, the countries like China, India 
and Brazil have become regular invitees to the G-7/8 meetings. These countries are 
already members in G-20 that is expected to shape the outcome that affects all 
including the small economies from the Third World. G-20 can play a positive role 
subject to the condition that G-7 does not superimpose its heavyweight on G-20 
while setting its agenda. While it may be difficult for such policy coordinating 
institutions to include all the politically sovereign countries, even on a rotational 
basis, because of the large number of such countries, the proactive role played by 
the LEMEs from the Third World may open up the path of participation of the large 
number of small countries in the IEO on terms acceptable to them.                       
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